United States-European co-operation in advanced technology. Assembly of Western European Union Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session (Second Part) Document 889, 29th October 1981 by Hill, Mr.
DOCUMENT 889 29th October 1981 
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
TWENTY-S£VENTH ORDINARY SESSION 
(Second Part) 
United States-European co-operation 
in advanced technology 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur 
ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
43, avenue du President Wilson. 75775 Paris Cedex 16 ·Tel. 723.54.32 
Document 889 
United States-European co-operation 
in advanced technology 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
29th October 1981 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions2 
by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on United States-European co-operation in advanced technology 
ExPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur 
Introdution 
I. General 
II. Space developments 
III. Energy questions 
- Nuclear affairs 
- New and renewable sources of energy 
IV. Co-operation in weapon production 
V. Law of the sea 
VI. Activities of aircraft companies visited 
- Gen~ral Dynamics Corporation 
- Lockheed Corporation 
- McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
- Boeing Company 
- Grumman Corporation 
APPENDICES 
I. Programme of the visit to the United States by the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions- 12th-24th July 1981 
II. List of questions put during the visit to the United States 
I. Adopted in Committee by 15 votes to 0 
with I abstention. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Valleix (Chairman); 
MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens, 
Amadei, Antoni, Barthe, Cornelissen, Fiandrotti, Forma, 
Fortier (Alternate : Bassinet), Fourre, Garrett (Alternate : 
Hill), Hawkins, McGuire (Alternate: Jesse!), Manning, 
Prilssen, Spies von Bullesheim, Topmann, van Waterschoot, 
Worrell. 
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on United States-European co-operation 
in advanced technology 
Referring to its Recommendation 3 I 6 on United States-European co-operation and competi-
tion in advanced technology, adopted in June 1978, and the Council's reply dated 16th November 
1978; 
Considering that some useful progress has been made in the development of European-
American links in the military sector of industry; 
Regretting that its proposal in Recommendation 316 for a high-level European-United States 
special committee to promote European-United States co-operation in advanced technology projects 
had been ignored by the governments concerned, although such a special committee could have 
played an important role in the co-ordination of advanced technology; 
Considering the growing need to co-operate for economic, financial, political and military rea-
sons, and, inter alia, because of budgetary restraints, with a view to avoiding overlapping in research 
programmes and needless delays and wastage of necessarily scarce financial resources; 
Considering the slow start and development of transatlantic technology transfer because of diffi-
culties in overcoming differences in standards; 
Aware of the serious problems between NASA and ESA due to respective priorities with regard 
to scientific programmes such as the joint international solar-polar mission; 
Conscious of the present American administration's stated willingness to inject new life into 
American-European collaboration in many fields of high technology, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Invite member governments: 
1. To study jointly how to bring military requirements into line with budgetary resources, for 
instance by the further joint development of new composite materials for military hardware, in order 
to halt the spiral of ever-increasing costs within military budgets, or by using an existing platform as 
was the case with the Boeing 707 and the Nimrod for AWACS or could be the Tornado for electronic 
jamming devices; 
2. To study - in comparison with other systems - the various merits of the competing systems 
offered by the Lockheed/Dassault-Dornier Alpha-Jet trainer, the McDonnell Douglas/British Aero-
space Hawk trainer and the Grumman-Beechcraft project for the jet flight training of American navy 
pilots (VTXTS programme); 
3. To bear in mind the need for an up-to-date and as comprehensive as possible European milit-
ary pilots' training system promoting harmonisation in the training systems and finally conclude that 
the best system should also be adopted generally in the European theatre; 
4. To foster, within the framework of the International Energy Agency related to the OECD, 
where appropriate, a co-ordinated research and development programme, especially with regard to 
solar and wind energy which have to be funded by governments in order to avoid developments 
within national boundaries which fail to take account of developments in the same fields in other 
countries; 
5. To invite the French Government to participate in the efforts in the International Energy 
Agency towards a collaborative and imaginative research and development programme; 




7. To instruct their diplomatic missions in the United States to follow closely developments in 
respect of: 
(a) the international solar-polar mission which should have priority for NASA funding as 
otherwise confidence would be lost in the future of American-European space collabor-
ation; 
(b) the use of Spacelab components or elements for building and developing future space 
stations or platforms; 
(c) the use of European remote-sensing satellite systems first for oceanic observation and later 
for land resources surveillance; 
(d) the space telescope programme; 
8. With regard to the law of the sea conference, to be wary of a split between the policies of Wes-
tern European nations on the one hand and between the attitudes of Europe and the United States on 
the other hand, and to reconcile the need for developing countries to have access to ocean resources, 





(submitted by Mr. Hill, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
I. The Committee wishes to preface its 
report by expressing its sincere appreciation of 
the valuable assistance afforded by the United 
States Embassy in Paris, the State Department, 
NASA, and other authorities contributing to 
the arrangements which made the visit to the 
United States from 12th to 26th July 1981 
a success. The Committee visited the State 
Department, the Departments of Defence and 
Energy, NASA and five aerospace industries, 
four on the west coast and one in New York1• 
2. In preparing for this visit the Committee 
studied a number of questions for use as guide-
lines in its discussions on research and develop-
ment policy, the sea law, space activities and 
questions on nuclear energy as well as renew-
able resources of energy2• Moreover, the Com-
mittee believed it would be useful to discuss 
political aspects of NATO affairs so as to place 
the more technical discussions in the wider 
framework of overall East-West relations. 
I. General 
3. In the framework of overall East-West 
relations of a political nature the Committee 
was briefed by Mr. H. Allen Holmes, Senior 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Euro-
pean Affairs and former Counsellor at the Uni-
ted States Embassy in Paris. He pointed out 
that in order to enhance the security of the 
United States the new Reagan administration 
had decided to embark upon a major program-
me to improve the United States military capa-
bility. It wished to deny the Soviets any 
opportunity to conduct a foreign policy aimed 
at exploiting real or perceived American milit-
ary weaknesses. Second, the administration 
considered Europe to be its principal partner 
and it would make a great effort to strengthen 
the Alliance relationship and bilateral relations 
with friendly European countries which shared 
the strategic interests of the United States. 
4. Since the new administration had started 
its term of office two excellent NATO meetings 
had been held and there had been a number of 
bilateral contacts. The Secretary of State, Mr. 
Haig, and the Secretary of Defence, Mr. Wein-
berger, had a more realistic approach to the 
I. See the programme of the visit at Appendix I. 
2. See Appendix II. 
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USSR-United States relationship and wanted to 
pursue co-ordinated foreign, defence and econo-
mic policies. This was the United States 
objective for the Ottawa summit meeting. At 
the same time they considered that America 
must again show that it was a reliable partner, 
consistent in its approach to international 
problems and balanced in its policies. For this 
reason the United States Government believed 
that the NATO defence budget should be 
increased by 3 % in real terms in both the 
conventional and nuclear areas. At the same 
time measures should be taken to promote talks 
on arms control and eventually disarma-
ment. At the end of this year the foreign 
secretary would meet with his Soviet counter-
part to start such talks with a view to achieving 
the lowest possible levels of armaments. 
5. It should not be forgotten that since 1963 
the United States theatre nuclear arms had not 
been modernised whereas the Soviets had 
deployed a new type of missile, the SS-20, with 
three warheads each, 220 of which were now 
stationed in Eastern Europe. At the same time 
the Soviet Union had not withdrawn its more 
than I ,000 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles. It was 
therefore mther ironic that the Soviet Govern-
ment should now talk about a moratorium 
since this would place the United States at a 
disadvantage. The military balance in Europe 
should therefore be improved in the conven-
tional as well as theatre nuclear fields and 
greater allied defence contributions were to be 
encouraged. At the same time the United 
States Government approved of the French 
initiative now being discussed in Madrid for a 
European conference on disarmament during 
which the human rights questions mentioned in 
the final act of the Helsinki conference should 
also be discussed. 
6. Improved European security would also 
benefit the Alliance elsewhere in the world. If 
they felt confident of their security at home, 
Western European nations might be individu-
ally more willing to assist the United States in 
defending common interests outside the NATO 
area. For instance, in the Persian Gulf several 
NATO countries had quietly assembled a body 
of ships which might form a psychological 
defence barrier and avoid a disruption of traffic 
in the Strait of Hormuz, which was of course 
of great importance for the supply of oil for the 
United States and Western Europe. 
7. An important difference in policy as 
compared to that of the former Carter adminis-
tration was that all questions were now being 
examined in terms of overall security and the 
approach was not compartmentalised as in the 
days of the Carter administration. Arms 
control discussions were thus linked to Soviet 
activities in Afghanistan, Iran, Poland, etc. At 
the same time the United States did not wish a 
confrontation with the USSR but sought an 
equilibrium and a balance of power. Neither 
wished the United States to have military supe-
riority. 
8. The growth in the United States defence 
budget would be 7 % in real terms and the 
government hoped that this increase in defence 
spending would be a signal to the USSR. At 
the same time the United States Government 
hoped that the European allies would continue 
to accept the 1979 goal of a 3 % increase in real 
defence spending. This was already being 
carried into effect in several countries and was 
of great political importance in order to avoid 
first and second class NATO nations. 
9. Finally, on the question ofthe strength of 
the United States dollar, one should be aware 
that the high interest rates were a consequence 
of the monetary policy of the Reagan adminis-
tration to reduce its deficit and to achieve a 
balance of payments. Only two years ago 
these goals were demanded by the European 
governments as then they considered the dollar 
too weak, preventing them from exporting their 
goods and services. 
II. Space developments 
10. On Monday, 13th July, the Committee 
met in the State Department with Mr. James 
Malone, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific 
Affairs. He gave a general outline of the 
policy of the Reagan administration in several 
areas such as space activities, research and 
development priorities, nuclear affairs and the 
law of the sea. In this chapter, your Rappor-
teur wishes to cover general research and deve-
lopment priorities and United States space acti-
vities. In following chapters he will deal with 
nuclear affairs, the law of the sea and aeronau-
tical developments. 
11. The new administration intended to rely 
increasingly on the private sector for its 
research and development policy. There was 
therefore a downward trend in research and 
development support which reflected the admi-
nistration's overall intention to trim federal 
spending. So far there had been no compre-
hensive policy statement on federal research 
and development, but the general outlines were 
evident from the 1982 budget proposals. Some 
salient points included: (a) In basic research the 
5 
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United States Government clearly intended to 
maintain a strong base; emphasis would be on 
quality with some attempt to identify areas rele-
vant to national security requirements. Over-
all basic research support would grow just 
enough to keep pace with inflation; in physical 
sciences, mathematics and engineering there 
would be modest real growth and a slight 
decline in biomedical sciences. (b) Research 
and development in defence areas would be 
increased significantly. (c) Support for social 
and behavioural research had been cut. (d) 
Priorities of programmes in applied research, 
development and demonstration had been 
reordered to reflect greater reliance on market 
forces, especially in civilian technology. (e) 
Tax incentives had been proposed to encourage 
greater research and development invest-
ment. (/) International co-operation in science 
and technology were very important for the 
new administration. Collaborative research 
and development were especially important as 
pressure on all national budgets was grow-
ing. This would be the answer for the rising 
costs of scientific and technological ventures in 
space, oceanographic research, fusion energy 
development, high energy physics and other 
fields such as natural resources and health. 
12. The foreign policy implications of natu-
ral resources management were very signifi-
cant. The western world had to use every 
opportunity to impress upon other parts of the 
world the seriousness of the global situation 
created by the demands of an expanding popu-
lation on the resource base and the resulting 
threat to the environment. If the world was to 
alter the intensive consumption patterns of the 
past, which could not be sustained in future, it 
had to develop choices that did not lock coun-
tries into resource-intensive infrastructures. 
13. Turning to the United States policy on 
space, Mr. Malone pointed out that the United 
States space programme was an extremely 
broad-based one, ranging from planetary explo-
ration, as a means of contributing to man's 
knowledge of the universe, to direct, everyday 
applications in communications, navigation and 
crop forecasting. By their very nature space 
activities were international in scope and inter-
national co-operation had been an important 
part of the United States civil space programme 
from its conception. 
14. Bilateral and multilateral projects with 
Europe, Canada and Japan had been very suc-
cessful and both the United States Government 
and the United States Congress supported and 
expected such co-operation to continue. How-
ever, the current economic situation would 
have a great impact on national and inter-
national space programmes. 
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15. Broad international participation in the 
United States space programme meant a major 
restructuring of the NASA budget which neces-
sarily affected international agreements too. 
The State Department had been working with 
NASA and representatives of ESA and of each 
Western European country to alleviate the first 
effects. Current budget restraints should not be 
misunderstood as lack of support for interna-
tional co-operation. Mr. George A. Keyworth 
II, the Science Adviser Designate to the Presi-
dent, had stated that international co-operation 
was high on his list of priorities. 
16. As far as the State Department's respon-
sibilities were concerned, several trends would 
call for increased attention: (a) The planned 
growth of the shuttle programme would require 
the negotiation of new agreements for contin-
gency landing sites and emergency rescues. (b) 
Remote sensing would become operational in 
the same way as satellite communications some 
years ago. Responsibility would pass from 
NASA to NOAA 1 and then to the private 
sector and thus the State Department would 
have an important role in arranging for foreign 
users to have access to data on a non-
discriminatory and fair price basis. Regional 
meetings with developing countries as future 
users were planned for 1981 and 1982 to 
improve understanding of their needs as plans 
for future system designs were being drawn 
up. (c) As Landsat ground stations proliferated 
and other countries made increasing use of the 
shuttle, new and difficult questions of techno-
logy transfer and expert control would arise. In 
the past year stations had begun operations in 
Japan, India, Australia, Argentina and South 
Africa; existing stations were in Canada, Brazil, 
Italy and Sweden and future stations would be 
established in Thailand and mainland China. A 
number of other countries were considering 
joining the system as well. (d) A special effort 
was being made to promote co-operation in 
remote sensing with other countries. Meetings 
had been instituted with ESA, France, Canada 
and Japan in order to make the launch sche-
dules, transit times and read-out procedures 
complementary and compatible. This would 
enable users to draw the maximum advantage 
from the different national programmes to the 
mutual benefit of all. 
17. Of special importance to Europe was the 
international solar-polar mission. Two space-
craft, one developed by ESA and the other by 
NASA, would be launched together by the iner-
tial upper stage (IUS) from the earth orbiting 
space shuttle into interplanetary trajectories 
towards Jupiter. The launch was planned to 
take place in February 1983. The mission 
I. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
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would give scientists an insight into the solar 
system and especially a view on the sun itself. 
However, funding for the NASA satellite had 
been stopped by the Reagan administration. 
The State Department considered this mission 
an important scientific and international co-
operative project. It was working closely with 
NASA, the budget office, the office of the Presi-
dent's science adviser, and ESA officials to do 
its utmost to meet the objectives set 
out in the United States understandings with 
ESA. No final decision had yet been made. 
One would have to wait until the newly-
appointed NASA Administrator, Mr. Beggs, 
had had an opportunity to review the restruc-
turing of the space science programme. The 
State Department hoped for a successful out-
come, especially as ESA-NASA collaboration 
on Spacelab had been most encouraging. 
However, there could be no doubt that fiscal 
and budgetary policies would have an impact 
on future space programmes. 
18. Other international space programmes 
were the solar maximum mission for which the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands provided 
the instruments, the infrared astronomical satel-
lite which involved NASA, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom for a planned launch in 
1982, the Galilee Jupiter orbiter which was a 
co-operative project with the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and finally the space telescope 
which was a NASA-ESA projet. The most 
important collaborative project was Spacelab, of 
which two flight units were contracted by 
NASA. 
19. On 14th July the Committee visited the 
NASA Headquarters in Washington where it 
was received by Dr. James Beggs, the newly-
appointed Administrator, who underlined the 
need for ESA and NASA to continue their co-
operative space projects. Collaboration was 
even more important since budgetary difficul-
ties had arisen on both sides of the ocean. 
Nevertheless the American budget for fiscal 
year 1982 would still exceed $6.1 billion. 
Nearly half of this was to be spent on the shut-
tle, but even if space transportation system 
expenditure was completely excluded the 
NASA budget would still be more than seven 
times that of ESA. 
20. Also on 14th July the Committee made 
an extremely interesting tour of the Goddard 
Space· Flight Center where it was shown slides 
and films complementary to briefings at the 
NASA headquarters. 
21. On the space transportation system a 
NASA representative pointed out that the flight 
of the space shuttle had been so successful that 
only minor repairs had to be made, especially 
with regard to the heat protecting tiles. The 
damage at the launch site at Cape Canaveral 
was also minor and without much repair the 
same launching site could be used. 
22. The breakdown of the usage of the shut-
tle system would be 28 % for flying scientific 
missions and 30 % for defence missions. The 
auxiliary rocket IUS (inertial upper stage) to be 
developed by Boeing was now at the testing 
stage and would become operational in 1983. 
23. For foreign users NASA would only reco-
ver the operational costs and not the costs for 
the shuttle research and development. 
24. The next shuttle launch would take place 
early in November 1981. The load planned 
for the second experimental orbital flight would 
be a selection of test instruments. 
25. Four or five shuttles would be built in 
the coming decade. Each shuttle might be 
reused as many as I 00 times. If the system 
was fully operational there might be some forty 
shuttle flights a year. 
26. Beyond the currently planned and appro-
ved experiments the shuttle could carry into 
orbit modules for constructing large platforms 
in space. 
27. It was NASA's intention to use the 
Spacelab facilities to conduct many experiments 
in such fields as medicine, metallurgy, astro-
nomy and pharmaceuticals. Throughout its 
mission Spacelab remained attached to the 
shuttle and on return to earth it would be refit-
ted for its next assignment. The Spacelab had 
been designed for reuse about fifty times and 
with a ten years' lifetime. There would be 
mixed cargo missions and also "dedicated" 
Spacelab missions in which the whole payload 
bay would be used for one special mission. 
28. Spacelab's main elements were the pres-
surised laboratory, which afforded shirt-sleeve 
working conditions, and an instrument-carrying 
platform called the pallet that exposed mate-
rials and equipment directly to space. Each of 
these was segmented for mission flexibility; 
either could be flown alone or in more than 
half a dozen different combinations with the 
other. As many as five pallet segments could 
be flown at one time, each three metres long. 
They served as platforms for mounting instru-
ments and could also provide electrical power 
and furnish connections for commanding expe-
riments and acquiring data from them. Equip-
ment and experiments could be serviced by 
astronauts in space suits. The laboratory 
module could accommodate three people regu-
larly and a fourth for brief periods~ 
29. Spacelab missions would concentrate on 
intensive, relatively short investigations that 
complemented long-term observation program-
7 
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mes using free-flying satellites. Once the iner-
tial upper stage had been built the shuttle could 
bring into geosynchronous or high-altitude 
orbits satellites of some 2,300 kilos. 
30. One of the first assignments would be to 
place tracking and data relay satellites in geo-
synchronous orbit to handle communications 
between all elements of the space transportation 
system. Space operations in the past had 
depended mainly on ground stations and 
tracking ships for communications and there 
had been large blind spots in the coverage. 
31. Two tracking and data relay satellites, 
one on the equator of Brazil and one over the 
Pacific Ocean, and a single ground station at 
White Sands, New Mexico, made it possible to 
track and communicate with the orbiter and 
most spacecraft for 85% or 98% of the time. 
There would therefore be very few out-of-touch 
periods. The tracking and data relay satellites 
would be supplemented by the remaining sta-
tions of the older global space tracking and data 
network and the NASA ground communica-
tions network would continue to link the 
tracking stations and control centres. 
32. The space telescope would be launched 
in 1983. It was the most ambitious space 
astronomy project yet undertaken. Operating 
well above the optically obscuring effects of 
earth's atmosphere, the telescope would be able 
to detect objects fifty times more faint and 
seven times further away than those which 
could be seen by telescopes on earth. The 
solar array and photon detector assembly were 
being developed and manufactured by British 
Aerospace under contracts from the European 
Space Agency. 
33. Launches of early shuttle missions, both 
civilian and military, were from Kennedy Space 
Center, Florida, out over the Atlantic Ocean to 
avoid flying over populated areas in the critical 
first minutes. This direction also gave space-
bound vehicles extra velocity from the earth's 
eastward rotation. The payloads from here 
included all communications satellites and 
others for geosynchronous orbit. Missions 
requiring polar orbits, including many weather 
and earth survey satellites, were launched 
southward over the open Pacific from Vanden-
berg Air Force Base in California. 
34. During its visit to Cape Kennedy the 
Committee was briefed on the first space shut-
tle, the Columbia, and watched it being ser-
viced. The Committee also made a tour of the 
different launch sites, the first being used in 
1950. It visited the launch sites for the Delta, 
Atlas-Centaur, Titan-Centaur, Saturn V and 
Skylab and also for the Mercury and Gemini, 
Apollo-Soyuz missions and the space shuttle 
itself. 
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35. At the Pentagon, the Committee was 
briefed on the military aspects of the American 
space programme•. For the Soviet Union as 
well as for the United States the space segment 
was becoming increasingly important for the 
deployment of military forces. Both countries 
had therefore launched a large number of mili-
tary satellites for communications systems. As 
a general rule one could state that for every 
civil satellite, five military satellites were to be 
launched. 
36. Apart from communications there were 
meteorological and surveillance satellites. Once 
the shuttle became fully operational the 
Defence Department would change from indivi-
dual rocket launches to shuttle launches. On 
surveillance satellites it was noted that one of 
the reasons why the SALT II treaty was not 
well received in the Senate was that the Sena-
tors were not convinced that the treaty could be 
adequately verified by satellites alone. 
3 7. In an international framework there was 
the NATO satellite communication system as 
well as the United Kingdom Skynet system. 
Military launches took place from Vandenberg 
Air Force Base as well as from Cape Kennedy. 
38. The ESA Representative in Washington 
pointed out to the Committee that the Reagan 
administration was firmly committed to reduce 
both expenditure and the role of government in 
the affairs of the nation. One result would be 
that NASA's space science budget would be 
reduced, which had already led to the, one 
hoped provisional, cancellation of the United 
States spacecraft in the international solar-polar 
mission. It also had led to the cancellation of 
a proposed joint cometary mission which would 
take a spacecraft to within 1 ,000 kms of the 
Halley comet when it next approached the 
earth. 
39. ESA considered the first mission especi-
ally as extremely important and on the United 
States side it had been selected only after the 
normal review of the claims of competing mis-
sions. Nevertheless, for one reason or another 
the international solar-polar mission had been 
in almost continuous trouble for the past three 
years. The final blow came on 18th February 
1981 when NASA informed ESA that due to 
budget cuts they were cancelling the United 
States spacecraft. ESA had been trying to 
redress the situation and an acceptable compro-
mise should emerge. Failing this, it would 
have to be concluded that the United States 
lacked the political will to find a solution. 
40. The Reagan administration might also 
yield to growing pressure to hive off operational 
I. See also Document 883, Chapter II, Military aspects of 
space. 
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systems to the private sector, as was already the 
case for remote sensing. 
41. On the other hand, its commitment to 
the shuttle, mainly because of its national secu-
rity role, could be considered absolute. 
42. On the establishment of permanent or 
semi-permanent space facilities a campaign was 
building up to persuade the administration to 
embark on the development of a space station 
or space platform. Here too military conside-
rations might play a more important role than 
those of science or applications. If such sta-
tions or platforms were built ESA hoped that 
Spacelab components would be used as ele-
ments of the building block. 
43. In the field of space science and applica-
tions there might be increased scope for co-
operation as the United States would not be 
able to cover all fields. For instance, the ocean 
remote-sensing satellite had been cancelled and 
there were many in the United States who were 
hoping to have access to data acquired by 
ESA's ERS-1 remote-sensing satellite system for 
oceanic observation. 
44. Finally, in areas where there was quite 
intense competition between European and 
American industries, for example in satellite 
communications, it had become clear that there 
were many areas such as data standards where 
co-operation was essential if only to remain 
competitive. 
III. Energy questions 
45. In this chapter your Rapporteur wishes to 
make a distinction between nuclear affairs and 
the American interest in new and renewable 
energy resources. 
Nuclear affairs 
46. The Reagan administration had not yet 
announced specific points of its new energy 
policy, but over the past six months an inten-
sive review of United States policy had been 
conducted to develop the peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy and to prevent the spread of 
nuclear weapons. 
4 7. A basic element of the new policy would 
be a total embargo on nuclear explosive mate-
rial. The United States was deeply committed 
to preventing any increase in nuclear explosive 
capability and would pursue an active policy to 
that end. The government would seek to 
strengthen the global non-proliferation regime 
as embodied particularly in the non-proli-
feration treaty, the treaty of Tlatelolco and the 
safeguard system of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Vienna. The government 
was also determined to restore United States 
credibility as a reliable nuclear supplier. At 
the same time it would work with other nuclear 
supplier nations and with nations sharing the 
American non-proliferation objectives to reduce 
the threat of nuclear proliferation. Distinc-
tions would be made among nations based on 
the degree of proliferation risk which a parti-
cular country presented. The United States 
would place greater emphasis on nuclear power 
to meet its domestic energy needs. 
48. When the new policy was announced all 
the abovementioned elements would be set 
forth in such a way that it would be clear that 
the United States would re-establish itself on 
the nuclear marketplace. 
49. United States support for the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency and its many 
programmes was directly related to the national 
security of the United States. The Agency 
monitored significant quantities of sensitive 
nuclear material, thereby reducing the risk of 
misuse of such material. The United States 
participated in the Agency's studies on inter-
national plutonium storage and spent fuel 
management which had a long-range impact on 
the nation's security by developing new 
methods and institutions to strengthen the non-
proliferation regime. 
50. The two-year study to evaluate the inter-
national nuclear fuel cycle was concluded in 
February 1980. Its purpose was to improve 
international understanding of the energy and 
non-proliferation implications of future deci-
sions about the nuclear fuel cycle. Of parti-
cular concern were plans for energy indepen-
dence through acquisition of reprocessing and 
enrichment facilities by an increasing number 
of countries and towards the commercial use of 
plutonium. Over sixty countries participated 
in the evaluation, which made a major contri-
bution to clearing up the international nuclear 
atmosphere. 
51. In the Capitol, where the Committee met 
with members of the Senate Subcommittee for 
Science, Technology and Space and the 
Committee for Science and Technology of the 
House of Representatives, it was pointed out 
that the nuclear energy policy was not a parti-
san issue. Both parties were in favour of 
commercial nuclear power and both parties 
were of the opinion that there was a need to 
restructure the government role, especially on 
questions of safety regulations. Of course there 
had to be an agency to assure that the safety 
regulations were applied and adhered to, but on 
the other hand the government role should be 
as limited as possible. As an example, the 
Federal Aviation Administration was quoted 
and the deregulation of airline communica-
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tions. It was also pointed out that natural gas 
production had developed considerably since 
the Reagan administration abolished controls 
on gas drilling and prospecting. 
52. If the United States were to aim for a 
second generation of fission-based reactors it 
should look towards high temperature gas-
cooled systems which were far more economical 
than existing light-water reactors. Research on 
breeder reactors at the Clinch River facility had 
slowed down during the Carter administration 
although, because of Congress, it had never 
been stopped; this type of reactor might also be 
promoted by the new administration, which 
had earmarked $736.5 million for fiscal year 
1982 against $485.5 million in the Carter 1981 
budget. 
New and renewable sources of energy 
53. The Committee was briefed on this 
subject at the Department of Energy on Thurs-
day, 16th July. It was pointed out that in the 
United States there were seventy light-water 
power reactors which supplied II % of United 
States electric power requirements but in some 
states it might be 50% of the electric power. 
There were only two gas-cooled reactors in 
commercial operation and only a small 
research and development programme for this 
type of reactor. There were major obstacles to 
nuclear power expansion in the United States 
such as unknown factors in projected electricity 
demand, the financing of the utilities, long 
delays in licensing and many licensing uncer-
tainties. Public acceptance and understanding 
of reactor safety and waste disposal were dimi-
nishing. Much ground had been lost after the 
Three-Mile Island accident and it was still not 
yet sure what the future of the power plant 
would be. This and the decline in United 
States oil production in the 1970s had fostered 
research for alternative sources of energy. 
Experimental technologies were being tested for 
extracting the enormous amount of oil trapped 
in shale rock and tar ~nds. 
54. Since coal was plentiful in the United 
States there was the prospect of converting coal 
into so-called synthetic oil and gas. There 
were more than 6,000 mines employing more 
than 200,000 miners. About 80% of the 
annual production was from some I ,200 mines 
each producing over 100,000 tons annually. 
Surface mines now produced more than half of 
the total output. 
55. In addition to the United States commit-
ments to new energy resources, major research 
efforts were being undertaken on renewable, 
continuously replenished, energy resources such 
as sunlight, wind, biomass, ocean and direct 
solar radiation. Although the use of renewable 
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energy sources was rising, it accounted for only 
a small fraction of national energy consumption 
at the present time. 
56. The Federal budget for solar research and 
development was rising steadily and was more 
than $600 million for fiscal year 1981. For 
previous years it was $596 million in 1980 and 
$514 million in 1979. Whether these impor-
tant sums would continue to increase under the 
new administration was considered dubious. 
The existence of the department itself was still 
an open question and it was not considered 
impossible that it would be converted into an 
energy research and development agency. 
57. Until a new policy was formulated the 
department's goal was to reduce the nation's 
reliance on foreign sources of oil and to orga-
nise an orderly transition to alternative energy 
sources. In the period between the early 1980s 
and the early 1990s the transition from use of 
imported oil depended not only on increases in 
conservation but also on increased domestic gas 
and oil production, increased use of nuclear 
energy and coal and significant use of renew-
able energy systems. The main systems in 
this period would be based on solar thermal 
and photovoltaic technologies. Beyond the 
1990s the emphasis was to be placed on oil 
from oil shale, coal-derived synthetic fuels, 
nuclear energy and renewable energy sources. 
58. In order to promote these special solar 
technologies, tax credits were being provided to 
individuals and businesses. Other financial 
incentives were given by the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to promote 
solar installations with home owners. Several 
solar technologies were currently considered 
cost-competitive in many areas of the United 
States, such as biomass energy systems, which 
would provide 2% of the United States energy 
requirement each year. Biomass energy could 
be used to produce heat and power for residen-
tial, industrial and agricultural applications, to 
generate electricity and to produce liquid fuels 
for transportation. 
59. Photovoltaic energy systems used solar 
cells assembled and connected in modular 
panels, mounted in arrays to convert sunlight 
directly into electricity. This method provided 
safe and reliable energy for a wide range of 
applications. It had started in the south-east of 
the United States and might be cost-competitive 
in 1985-86. By the year 2000 it could provide 
an annual generating capacity of approximately 
50 gigawatts. 
60. The wind energy conversion system was 
also technically proven and could become cost-
competitive in 1985-86. The main problem 
was the development of an economical wind 
energy conversion system ·capable of providing 
10 
up to thirty years of reliable and relatively 
maintenance-free service. 
61. The solar heating and cooling of build-
ings used solar energy through an active solar 
system, a passive solar system, or a combina-
tion of both. The active system intercepted 
solar radiation and converted it into thermal 
energy. The passive system had a solar collec-
tion area, an absorber and a heat distribution 
method. The system was feasible only when it 
was built into new houses or buildings. It 
required the development of new materials and 
systems for building. In the United States it 
would be possible in the near future to have 
some 300,000 houses with a built-in solar 
system. 
62. Agricultural and industrial process heat 
was another project of the Department of 
Energy's solar energy and development budget. 
63. Agriculture and industry used about 40% 
of the total energy consumed in the United 
States. The purpose of the programme was to 
develop and demonstrate solar components and 
technology that could supply significant 
amounts of heat energy for agricultural and 
industrial applications. The industrial process 
solar systems that supply heat are not presently 
cost-competitive with non-renewable heat 
resources. The agricultural process market is 
already fairly well defined and was in the 
process of being used experimentally, especially 
for grain drying, crop drying, food processing, 
etc. 
64. The solar thermal power systems, the 
ocean systems programme and the satellite 
power system were still in an early research 
stage and it was questionable whether these sys-
tems would be utilised much before the year 
2000. 
65. The solar energy programme had led to a 
number of international co-operative actions 
and agreements. The most important were 
those with Saudi Arabia, Italy, Israel and 
Spain. In Spain a small solar power demons-
tration project for solar thermal generation 
would be established. Two engineering 
concepts in two 500 Kw solar plants would be 
tested. Agreements had been concluded with 
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands and the 
Federal Republic of Germany for experiments 
on certain parts of medium- and large-scale 
wind turbines. These agreements had been 
concluded in the framework of the International 
Energy Agency in Paris. 
IV. Co-operation in weapon production 
66. At the Pentagon the Committee was 
briefed on some of the Department of Defence's 
science and technology problems. Its research 
and development programme had a budget of 
$3.9 billion, just over half of which was spent 
in industry and the remainder in defence estab-
lishments. The main items were very high 
speed integrated circuits to achieve high pre-
cision manufacturing technology and high 
energy lasers to be built in weapons systems, 
which would lead to new and fundamentally 
different weapons systems than those which 
existed today. The purpose was to arrive at 
operational-directed energy weapons. Defence 
against chemical warfare, especially as a deter-
rent to the use of enemy chemical agents, was 
also a main budget item. 
67. In order to avoid duplication of weapon 
developments in Europe and in the United 
States there should be a greater exchange of 
information much earlier than was now the 
practice. Research and development program-
mes should be better co-ordinated through 
agreements on joint requirements for new wea-
pons systems such as the F-16, the AV-8B 
advanced Harrier and the family of air-to-air 
guided weapons, AMRAAM and ASRAAM. 
The United States had concluded eleven gene-
ral memoranda of understanding with as many 
NATO countries in order to arrive at coproduc-
tion or dual production of the same types of 
weapons systems. It also promoted the 
concept of families of weapons systems. 
68. In co-operation, political and economic 
cohesion should be strengthened through sha-
ring technology and greater interoperability. 
The 3% increase in real value of the defence 
budgets should leave room for joint ventures ; 
restrictions because of preferences to buy natio-
nal should be waived on a reciprocal basis ; 
competition in the defence market of each 
NATO country should be facilitated and indus-
trial consortia extending beyond national fron-
tiers should be encouraged. This would also 
promote greater efficiency as it could eliminate 
duplication in research and development pro-
jects. 
69. The United States had drawn up a list of 
seventeen first-rate high technology weapons 
systems with regard to air defence, artillery, air-
to-air missiles, mines, night vision equipment, 
portable anti-tank weapons, advanced attack 
helicopters, etc. The Independent European 
Programme Group should also prepare such a 
list. A comparison between the two might 
improve efficiency in the Alliance development 
programme, satisfy the national aspirations of 
government and industries and create a favour-
able environment for procuring new weapons 
systems. 
70. Within the NATO framework discussions 
should be held on difficult issues such as armed 
forces requirements, schedules, third country 
sales, management of programmes, conflicts 
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through competition, budgetary aspects and 
technology transfer. Special attention should 
also be paid to proprietary restrictions, recipro-
city in policies and procedures and setting up 
consortia for cost-effectiveness. 
71. A major problem was also the reluctance 
of European countries to adopt families of 
weapons systems as the long industrial runs in 
the United States would always make produc-
tion there cheaper. However, in modem wea-
pons systems this handicap might be less im-
portant than it used to be. An example of an 
industrial consortium quoted was the ammu-
nition consortium set up between the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Italy and the 
Netherlands to share a very large order for 
ammunition in order to redress low stocks of 
ammunition in Europe. 
V. Law of the sea 
72. The fourth subject discussed by Mr. 
James Malone, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs, was the law of the sea. 
Apart from being Assistant Secretary of State, 
Mr. Malone was also the President's special 
representative for the law of the sea conference. 
73. As an introduction, your Rapporteur 
would mention that in the 1980 meetings of the 
third United Nations conference on the law of 
the sea the then United States Government 
negotiated widely-supported compromises on 
most of the major outstanding issues. The 
latest session concentrated on international 
machinery to regulate seabed mining, primarily 
for manganese nodules, and elaborated compro-
mises on the basic questions of the voting sys-
tem, composition and functions of the Council, 
the executive arm of the international seabed 
authority. 
74. Addressing the House of Representatives' 
Subcommittee for Merchant Marine and Fishe-
ries on 28th April 1981, Mr. Malone declared: 
" The draft convention creates a one-
nation one-vote international organisa-
tion which is governed by an assembly 
and a thirty-six-member executive coun-
cil. In the council, the Soviet Union 
and its allies have three guaranteed seats, 
but the United States must compete with 
its allies for any representation. The 
assembly is characterised as the ' supreme ' 
organ and the specific policy decisions of 
the council must conform to the general 
policies of the assembly. 
The draft convention provides that, after 
fifteen years of production, the provisions 
of the treaty will be reviewed to deter-
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mine whether it has fulfilled overriding 
policy considerations, such as protection 
of land-based producers, promotion of 
enterprise operations and equitable distri-
bution of mining rights. If two-thirds of 
the states, parties to the treaty, wish to 
amend provisions concerning the system 
of exploitation, they may do so after five 
years of negotiation and after ratification 
by two-thirds of the states parties. If the 
United States were to disagree with duly 
ratified changes, it would be bound by 
them nevertheless, unless it exercised its 
option to denounce the entire treaty. 
The draft convention imposes revenue-
sharing obligations on seabed mining cor-
porations which would significantly 
increase the costs of seabed mining. 
'-The draft convention imposes an interna-
tional revenue-sharing obligation on the 
production of hydrocarbons from the 
continental shelf beyond the 200-mile 
(322-km) limit. Developing countries that 
are net importers of hydrocarbons are 
exempt from the obligation. 
The draft convention contains provisions 
concerning liberation movements, like 
the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisa-
tion), and their eligibility to obtain a 
share of the revenues of the seabed 
authority. 
The draft convention lacks any provi-
sions for protecting investments made 
prior to entry into force of the conven-
tion." 
75. When the Committee met with Mr. 
Malone on 13th July 1981, he stated that when 
the Reagan administration took office it was 
confronted with an informal draft convention 
on the law of the sea which was on the verge of 
being made final. It contained a number of 
provisions which raised concern as to whether 
this draft convention was consistent with the 
stated goals of the Reagan administration. In 
addition, many provisions of the draft conven-
tion had prompted substantial criticism from 
industry, Congress and the American public. 
The administration then decided that it was not 
in the American interest to proceed prematu-
rely to complete negotiations on a treaty that 
might fail to further American interests and 
which, in its present form, would not be ratified 
by the Senate. The Geneva session of the law 
of the sea conference starting in early August 
1981 would allow the United States Govern-
ment to discuss its misgivings over the current 
text. It would not be prepared to submit a 
new text. The results of the discussions would 
be made part of the review process and various 
options would be presented to the President. 
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As this process was bound to take time, nego-
tiations were unlikely to be concluded at the 
end of 1981 and it would be difficult to forecast 
just when they would be completed, although 
the process would not be delayed unduly. 
76. The question of deep-sea mining had 
been widely discussed and rightly so as it was of 
great importance. Polymetallic nodules were 
found on the floor of the ocean throughout 
many parts of the world. The Pacific Ocean 
was estimated to contain some 1.5 trillion tons 
of nodules, forming at the rate of 10 million 
tons per year. These nodules contained many 
different metals, the most important being 
nickel, copper, manganese and cobalt. All 
four were key materials for the United States 
defence industries in addition to their other 
important applications in the economy. 
77. Your Rapporteur might mention in this 
connection the following 1• Much of the 
world's production and reserves of a number of 
critical materials are located in Siberia and 
Southern Africa. These two areas contain 
99 % of the world's manganese ore, 97 % of its 
vanadium, 96% of its chrome, 87% of its dia-
monds, 60 % of its vermiculite and 50 % of its 
fluorspar, iron ore, asbestos and uranium. 
ZaYre and Zambia now provide 65 % of the 
world's cobalt. 
78. Mr. Malone pointed out that one of the 
most important questions to be resolved would 
be the competence of any supranational mining 
enterprise formed by the United Nations. The 
question of technology transfer, the problem of 
quantification, of competition between land-
based mining and seabed mining, and the ques-
tions of national security involved in industrial 
mining technology. The new administration 
would continue to consult its European allies 
on law of the sea issues. Meetings were held in 
Europe for this purpose. 
79. As the law of the sea conference was 
quite distinct from other areas, the United 
States Government was keeping in touch with 
the Government of the Soviet Union on law of 
the sea questions. There was a close relation-
ship because of the communality of interests. 
The linkage of issues mentioned earlier did not 
apply for this subject. The administration 
would not propose any amendments to the 
informal draft convention at the meeting in 
Geneva. It would test the opinion of the other 
participating countries to see whether there was 
a genuine meeting of minds. 
80. {t was clear that deep-sea mining could 
become a most important source for strategic 
I. See " The ailing defence industrial base : unready for 
crisis", 96th Congress, 2nd Session, Committee print No. 
29. 
materials and this question had therefore to be 
handled cautiously. 
81. Both the administration and prospective 
seabed miners were concerned that the current 
provisions of the draft convention would not 
ensure free and continuous access over the 
longer term to the polymetallic nodules. One 
of the United States concerns was related to the 
complex of issues related to decision-making in 
the international seabed authority. Because of 
the voting system the United States, which was 
one of the world's leading countries in the 
development of seabed mining, might be out-
voted by, for instance, the Eastern European 
countries. 
82. Another difficult point was that access to 
critical raw materials could be blocked by the 
legal and technical commission to be set up 
under the convention. 
83. Another point which was not acceptable 
to the United States concerned the transfer of 
technology provisions which could create subs-
tantial discrimination in favour of the interna-
tional enterprise and developing countries to 
the detriment of industrialised countries. 
84 As far as the future review conference 
was concerned, part of the treaty might possibly 
be altered by amendments ratified by two-thirds 
of the states parties and come into force for the 
United States in spite of American objections. 
This would raise a constitutional question 
which would certainly not be acceptable to the 
United States Senate. 
85. Finally, the treaty might create a situa-
tion in which the international. enterprise could 
use funds provided in part by the United States 
Government in order to halt mining activities 
by private American companies. 
86. Until the law of the sea treaty came into 
force several provisional international arrange-
ments had to be made. The Department of 
State had therefore initiated international nego-
tiations to establish reciprocal interim arrange-
ments co-ordinating regulation of deep seabed 
mining operations. They established ground 
rules by which participating countries would 
respect each other's deep seabed mining opera-
tions and require participating countries to 
apply effective measures for the protection of 
the marine environment. The participating 
countries included Belgium, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the Nether-
lands and the United Kingdom. 
VI. Activities of aircraft companies visited 
87. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
report, the Committee visited five private air-
craft companies, four on the west coast and one 
on the east coast. 
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General Dynamics Corporation 
88. At General Dynamics Corporation 
Convair Division in San Diego, California, the 
Committee was briefed on the general layout 
of the corporation, cruise missiles, gun develop-
ments, energy and space programmes. 
89. General Dynamics has a work force of 
84,000 divided into a number of divisions such 
as the Fort Worth Division where the F-16 is 
produced, the electronic division for automatic 
test equipment and high technology military 
electronics, the Convair Division in San Diego 
with a cruise-missile production capability, a 
marine division for electric boats and shipbuil-
ding, and the domestic resources group covering 
mining interests. Computer and telecommu-
nications activities also play an important role. 
90. General Dynamics Convair Division was 
under navy contract to develop the Tomahawk 
cruise missile, a pilotless aircraft to be launched 
from submarines and surface ships. It had an 
attack capability against targets at sea and on 
land and could be launched from naval aircraft, 
submarines or surface ships. It could be equip-
ped with nuclear or conventional warheads. 
The land attack version of the Tomahawk used 
an inertial and terrain contour-matching gui-
dance system. This system controlled the mis-
sile on a preprogrammed flight path to the 
target. The Tomahawk had sufficient range to 
cover all theatre nuclear targets with an ample 
margin for survivable stand-off basing and 
defence avoidance routing. 
91. The anti-ship version of the Tomahawk 
used a modified Harpoon missile guidance 
system. This system allowed the Tomahawk 
to be fired at an enemy warship at a low alti-
tude to avoid detection. Initially the Toma-
hawk was to be launched from the torpedo 
tubes of attack submarines. For the new class 
of submarines, twelve vertical Tomahawk 
launch tubes were fitted in the forward part of 
the submarine. This installation would signifi-
cantly increase the weapon load of the ships 
while maintaining their missions and capability. 
92. The land-attack and anti-ship versions 
were scheduled to become operational in 
1982. A variant of the Tomahawk was the 
medium-range air-to-surface missile which 
could be launched from attack and fighter 
aircraft. This missile could carry a variety of 
different sizes and types of tactical weapons. 
93. General Dynamics was also producing in 
its Convair plant a new type of gun which 
might be used by Belgium, the Federal Repu-
blic of Germany, Italy and the United King-
dom. This type of gun was to be installed on 
ships and had a steel cover to protect it against 
aerial attack. The gun systems were of impor-
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tance to all three armed services of the United 
States. 
94. With regard to energy programmes Gene-
ral Dynamics was producing and installing large 
super-conducting magnet systems. These mag-
net systems might be used in nuclear or in 
conventional power plants and might greatly 
improve their efficiency. 
95. In the space field it had built the Atlas 
launcher of which some eighty had been used 
to launch navigation, weather, earth observa-
tion and technology satellites. Combined with 
the Centaur it had been able to launch satellites 
for deep space missions. 
96. The Centaur upper stage might also be 
used from the shuttle for deep-space missions 
from 1985 or 1986 onwards. The production 
line of these vehicles would continue well into 
the mid-1980s and even beyond. 
97. In the field of satellites General Dyna-
mics had built prototypes for large structures in 
space composed of several segments and had 
also produced a large number of different types 
of antenna. 
98. General Dynamics' most important pro-
duction line was for the F-I6 programme 1• 
More than 300 aircraft had been delivered to 
operational squadrons in the United States and 
in Europe. The all-weather capability of the 
F-16 had been significantly increased with the 
addition of radar-controlled missiles and the 
fire control components required to guide 
them. The new components would be instal-
led in the aircraft scheduled for delivery at the 
beginning of 1984. 
99. In 1981 the production rate would conti-
nue to increase with about 280 aircraft being 
scheduled for delivery against some 230 during 
I980. Additional orders for F-I6s had been 
received: 40 for the Egyptian air force and 
about I 00 for the Netherlands air force ; delive-
ries for most of the latter would start in the 
mid-I980s. General Dynamics had also recei-
ved orders from Israel, South Korea, and 
options from Australia, Greece and Spain. 
100. To broaden the base of the existing pro-
gramme and improve its potential for long-term 
production, the aircraft was to be equipped 
with a General Electric J-79 jet engine. This 
engine was now being evaluated by the air 
forces of a number of countries. 
I 0 I. Development was also under way for the 
F-I6XL, a higher performance version of the 
F-16 which would incorporate very advanced 
aerOdynamics and systems technologies. Its 
most distinguishing feature would be a new 
I. See Document 883. 
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highly-swept, cranked-arrow wing which had 
been developed over the past five years. This 
would give the F-I6XL a much shorter take-off 
and landing run, a greater weapon load and 
enhance its combat-readiness in air-to-air and 
air-to-ground missions. 
I02. In the electric boat division of General 
Dynamics, several problems which had caused 
delays in the delivery of the Trident and its 
SSN-688-class submarines and had now been 
overcome. Trident was the single most impor-
tant defence programme under development in 
the free world today and would continue to be 
the most important weapons system of the 
United States strategic forces well into the 
twenty-first century. The new submarines 
would have a 50% greater missile capacity and 
would be able to remain on station as mobile 
launching platforms for substantially longer 
periods than any submarine previously in ser-
vice. General Dynamics had a backlog of eight 
Tridents and fifteen SSN-688-class attack sub-
marines scheduled for delivery over the next 
five years. It was confident that these vessels 
would be delivered without fail in due course. 
Lockheed Corporation 
I 03. Like General Dynamics, Lockheed Cor-
poration builds aircraft, especially military air-
craft. It also has a large stake in space, buil-
ding launchers, satellites and other space-
craft. It designs missiles and rockets, is a 
shipbuilder and has important divisions to deal 
with energy, earth and ocean resources and 
electronics, especially computers. 
I 04. The Committee was briefed on the gen-
eral activities of Lockheed which has some 
90,000 employees. The most critical imme-
diate challenge for the company was the 
L-10 11 Tristar jetliner. It had had to reduce 
its production from twenty-five to eighteen air-
craft per year although it still had 300 on order. 
105. An important product for Lockheed was 
the Hercules cargo transport which had been 
launched in 1952 and of which more than 
1 ,500 had been delivered in many different ver-
sions to some fifty countries. Production of 
this aircraft might continue into the mid-1980s. 
106. The military version of the C-5 Galaxy, 
the world's biggest transport aircraft, was 
designed to transport tanks, tractors, trucks, 
helicopters, etc. 
107. The C-141 Starlifter transport was speci-
fically designed as a troop and cargo carrier. It 
was the main transporter for the United States 
air force and could fly combat-size forces to any 
area in the world. Development was under 
way to stretch the aircraft and increase its 
capacities. 
108. In the so-called "skunk" works at 
Burbank, Lockheed had built the strategic 
reconnaissance aircraft, the SR -71. It was the 
world's fastest and highest sustained flight air-
craft. It flew at more than 26,000 metres and 
could survey 260,000 square kilometres of the 
earth's surface in one hour. The Titanium 
SR-71 had been developed for the United States 
air force strategic air command. It was a 
single-seat strike reconnaissance aircraft called 
" project stealth" as it was difficult to detect on 
any radar screen. 
I 09. Another high-altitude strategic reconnais-
sance and special purpose aircraft was the U-2 
which had been developed in 1954. Deriva-
tives were still in use for the air force's tactical 
reconnaissance missions. A follow-up of this 
aircraft was the TR-IA now being built for 
strategic reconnaissance; production had begun 
in 1980. A civilian version was being built for 
NASA for its earth resources survey programme. 
110. In the space field Lockheed had built the 
Agena booster and satellite which was used nor-
mally as the upper stage of a two-stage launcher 
in combination with Atlas, Thor or Titan-
IIIB. Agenas had served as boosters or satelli-
tes on more than 300 missions. The Lockheed 
missile and space company had manufactured 
special insulated tiles to protect the space shut-
tle ; it was building an experimental solar elec-
tric propulsion wing to fly aboard the space 
shuttle and it was building the space telescope 
which would be launched in 1983 and was 
considered the most ambitious space astronomy 
project yet undertaken. 
Ill. Lockheed had also developed fleet 
ballistic missiles such as the Polaris A-1 with a 
range of I ,200 nautical miles, the Poseidon 
with a range of 2,500 nautical miles and now 
the Trident with a range of 4,000 nautical 
miles. The Trident missile had become opera-
tional in October 1979 and some twelve Posei-
don submarines were being converted to take 
Trident missiles. Although the range of the 
Trident was substantially greater than that of 
the Poseidon it was the same size and could 
thus be used in existing Poseidon subma-
rines. The Trident missile production was 
scheduled to continue well into the 1980s. 
112. For the United States army, Lockheed 
was developing the Aquila, a remotely-piloted 
vehicle controlled from the ground. The 
unmanned aircraft carried laser devices and 
television cameras and could be employed to 
fly military surveillance, reconnaissance and 
target acquisition missions. They could also 
be used for border controls and monitoring 
pollution. 
113. Lockheed had many other industrial acti-
vities such as building computerised air ter-
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minal information processing systems, aircraft 
servicing, maintenance, modification and sup-
port, many marine activities from the ocean 
surface to the very bottom of the sea, shipbuil-
ding and engineering, and management services 
for many United States Government agencies. 
114. In Greece it managed the design and 
construction of a major aircraft maintenance 
complex ; in Saudi Arabia it had developed a 
nationwide air traffic control system; in West 
Germany it maintained communications and 
other electronic equipment for the United 
States army and a computerised weapon control 
system for the Federal German navy. 
115. During its visit the Committee was espe-
cially briefed on the Lockheed Alpha-
Jet/VTXTS and the P-3 Orion anti-submarine 
warfare aircraft. 
116. Regarding the latter, it was pointed out 
that in 1958 Lockheed won a United States 
navy competition for an ofT-the-shelf anti-
submarine warfare aircraft which flew for the 
first time in 19 59 .. In the 1960s and 1970s 
updated versions of this aircraft were built for 
the United States navy, Australia and Japan. 
The present version in development would be 
the P-3 update Ill. Since June 1980, 53 7 of 
this aircraft had been delivered. The land-
based P-3 Orion carried highly sensitive detec-
tion devices, a computerised analysis system 
and anti-submarine weapons. Apart from the 
United States navy it was used by Australia, 
Canada, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway and Spain. Under a foreign 
military sales agreement drawn up in January 
1979 between the United States navy and the 
Netherlands, thirteen Orion patrol aircraft were 
to be delivered from 1981 onwards to 1984. 
117. The Canadian version called the Aurora 
combined the engines and airframe of the 
Orion with the advanced electronic systems of 
the Viking. The first Aurora had been delive-
red in 1980 and all fourteen would be delivered 
by the end of 1981. 
118. The anti-submarine warfare aircraft S-3A 
Viking had been introduced in the United 
States fleet in 1974 and was operating from 
aircraft carriers. The twin-engine Viking, as 
the land-based Orion, had been designed to 
counter the challenge posed by the new, 
quieter, faster and deeper-running submarines 
and missile-armed surface ships. 
119. The Committee also had a special brief-
ing on the United States navy trainer program-
me called the Lockheed Alpha-Jet/VTXTS, 
which was a new system for training carrier-
based naval aviators. The United States navy 
had asked Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas to 
submit an overall system to train its recruits for 
navy pilots and aviators. Lockheed had there-
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fore submitted a system which included acade-
mic courses, flight simulation courses and 
actual flight instruction. Lockheed had already 
provided comprehensive training programmes 
to support all Lockheed aircraft. In order to 
submit a complete programme it had concluded 
a collaboration arrangement with Logicon, a 
company which was specialised in training sys-
tems for the navy and the air force and would 
contribute to instructional systems develop-
ment, performance measurement and training 
management systems development. Lockheed 
itself had important simulation expertise in trai-
ning pilots of aircraft based on aircraft car-
riers. As trainer aircraft Lockheed had selected 
the Alpha-Jet produced by Dornier of Germany 
and Dassault of France. This aircraft was in 
use by the French as a trainer and by the 
Germans as a light attack aircraft. Six other 
countries had already bought it - Belgium, 
Ivory Coast, Morocco, Nigeria, Qatar and Togo 
-and Lockheed might produce it in the United 
States under licence.· The aircraft could carry 
a pilot through basic and advanced training and 
even into weapons delivery operations. The 
old T -38 navy training aircraft would not have 
been able to do this. Moreover, it was obsoles-
cent - too much time was required to train the 
pilots and its operating costs were rising. The 
integrated Lockheed system would develop 
highly-proficient carrier pilots, reduce their 
training time and the operating costs. The sys-
tem would also measure student performances 
and would manage the simulators and compu-
ters necessary for instruction as well as mana-
gement. 
120. If the United States navy accepted the 
Lpckheed proposals, the system could be fully 
operational in. the mid-1980s. The Lockheed 
Alpha-Jet would undergo slight modifications 
in the meantime for carrier_operations. 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
121. McDonnell Douglas has its head office in 
St. Louis, Missouri, employs a total of some 
85,000 people and has a division at Long 
Beach, California, called the Douglas Aircraft 
Company. During its visit to the Long Beach 
factory, the Committee was briefed on civil and 
military production lines and space activi-
ties. It visited the DC-9 Super 80 which was 
being assembled there, the DC-10 assembly line 
and its military derivative the advanced tanker-
cargo aircraft designated KC-1 OA. The pro-
duction of this aircraft began in 1978 and its 
first operational flight took place in early 1981. 
122. The main military McDonnell Douglas 
products were the F-4 Phantom, the F-15, of 
which, on 1st April 1980, some 530 had been 
delivered, and the F-18, of which some I ,400 
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would be delivered by the end of the 
1980s. This was a single-seat fighter intercep-
tor of which a carrier-based naval version also 
existed. 
123. For its space activities it had built the 
Delta launcher of which some 160 had been 
ordered since the early 1970s. McDonnell 
Douglas was also involved in the design, deve-
lopment and production of most of the Space-
lab hardware and the systems engineering for 
Spacelab operational capabilities. 
124. McDonnell Douglas was building four 
prototypes of the Harrier, the AV-8B advanced 
Harrier. The Harrier was originally a British 
plane but it was now being modified by 
McDonnell Douglas to meet the United States 
navy and marine corps requirements. The 
operational date planned for the A V -8B was 
mid-1985 should production be approved by 
the United States Defence Department. 
125. In the civil transport field a provisional 
agreement had been concluded with Fokker to 
study the manufacturing of the MDF-100, a 
new high technology commercial aircraft with a 
130-150 seat capacity. If the agreement was 
finalised, both companies would build the plane 
in Europe for the European market and in the 
United States for the American market. 
126. The Committee was given a special brief-
ing on the McDonnell Douglas version for the 
navy undergraduate jet flight training system, 
VTXTS. McDonnell Douglas had associated 
itself with British Aerospace and Sperry Flight 
Systems to offer a comprehensive solution for 
the navy's training system. The McDonnell 
Douglas solution would feature either a new 
design aircraft from McDonnell Douglas or the 
existing Hawk jet from British Aerospace. The 
latter would be the principal subcontractor for 
the aircraft components and Sperry Systems 
would be the principal subcontractor for flight 
simulators. The partners had placed strong 
emphasis on developing a truly integrated train-
ing system; aircraft, simulators, academics, 
management system and support would mutu-
ally maintain and optimise the training tasks. 
The new pilot should be able to direct a high 
performance jet without an expensive training 
time. There would therefore be 26 % more use 
of flight simulators and 20% less actual flying 
hours. 
127. As far as the aircraft was concerned one 
alternative would be based on a new aircraft 
design by McDonnell Douglas, the D-7000. It 
would have a very economic fuel consumption 
and a better performance than existing planes. 
The other alternative would be the British 
Aerospace Hawk aircraft which would have 
many advantages but not all those of a new air-
craft, but research and development costs would 
be much lower and it would be available ear-
lier. If chosen by the United States navy it 
would have to be modified for carrier opera-
tions and equipped with an updated cockpit 
produced in the United States. Some 180 
Hawk aircraft existed already and it had 
marked up an enviable safety record in the 
RAF which used this plane for advanced jet 
training and weapons training. It had already 
been in service since 1976. The modifications 
necessary to make the Hawk meet United States 
navy requirements were relatively simple and, 
although they would not be cheap, associated 
costs were hundreds of millions of dollars less 
than the cost of developing a new aircraft. 
128. The system could become operational in 
1987 and the United States navy would need 
some 500 of them in the early 1990s. 
Boeing Company 
129. At the head office of the Boeing Com-
pany in Seattle, the Committee was briefed on 
the composition of the company which was 
divided into a number of subsidiaries for 
commercial aircraft, aerospace, military aircraft, 
helicopters, engineering and construction, 
computer services and marine systems. It had 
about 110,000 personnel and sales of some $9.4 
billion. 
130. 85 % of the company worked on civil air-
craft, the 707, 727, 737, 747, 757 and 
767. The latter had started leaving the factory 
in August 1981. 
131. Military sales had approximated $1.5 
billion per year. The military programme was 
concerned with improving the B-52, modernis-
ing its electronics for improved navigation and 
weapons delivery, and for carrying and laun-
ching cruise missiles. 
132. The military subsidiary was also submit-
ting a version of a new CX strategic military 
transport plane which had been requested by 
the air force and on which a decision would be 
taken in 1981. Another important element of 
military production was the KC-135A tanker 
transport plane for the United States air force 
which would be fitted with more powerful and 
fuel-efficient new engines, and finally the 
AWACS aircraft on which the Committee was 
given a special briefing. 
133. Boeing Vertol (helicopter division) was 
producing Chinook helicopters for the United 
States army and was also marketing the Federal 
German MBB B0-105C helicopter. The 
Chinook helicopter was being used by some ten 
other nations. In its civilian version it served 
oil rigs in the North Sea. 
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134. In the space field Boeing had been selec-
ted by the United States air force to build the 
inertial upper stage {IUS) that would carry 
space shuttle payloads into higher orbit or into 
interplanetary trajectories. It was also building 
for NASA the solar electrical propulsion sys-
tems which would be used for certain payloads. 
Cruise missiles 
135. In the missile field Boeing Aerospace 
Company was building an air-launched cruise 
missile of which some 3,400 would be built 
during the 1980s. This missile was a small, 
unmanned, winged air-vehicle capable of sustai-
ned subsonic flight following launch from an 
airborne carrier aircraft. Boeing was in 
competition with General Dynamics, although 
it produced the better cruise missile. General 
Dynamics would also have its share in the 
order of the United States Defence Department 
with its Tomahawk cruise missile. The Boeing 
missile would fly at a speed of some 800 kms 
per hour and would be very hard to detect, its 
length being only 6.3 metres. It could fly as 
low as I 0 metres above ground and could be 
launched from aircraft such as the B-52, the 
F-16 or the Tornado at a rate of one every five 
seconds. The B-52, for instance, could carry as 
many as twenty missiles. There would be a 
big world market for this type of missile during 
the next ten years. Boeing was spending up to 
$1 billion on this programme and three other 
companies together were also spending $1 bil-
lion. Its main targets would be airfields, tank 
units, command and control facilities and, for 
instance, stockpiles of ammunition. It would 
have nuclear as well as non-nuclear warheads. 
136. It did not seem likely that certain types 
of aircraft could be replaced by cruise missiles. 
After the first three to seven days of hostili-
ties, aircraft would have to take over as it 
would take a long time to prepare the missile 
tapes. An appropriate answer to cruise missi-
les hardly existed as they were extremely diffi-
cult to spot. However, every offensive wea-
pon would one day find a counter-weapon. 
137. Apart from this briefing on cruise missi-
les, the Boeing Company briefed the Committee 
on eight other special subjects; these were 
Roland, AWACS, energy programmes, Viking 
spacecraft, the Space Operations Centre, 
WASP, hydrofoils and the Boeing 757-767 
technology. 
Roland 
138. Production of the United States army's 
Roland air defence missiles started in 1981, the 
programme having been initiated in 
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1975. Boeing Aerospace and Hughes Aircraft 
Company shared production responsibilities for 
the Roland system. They were under contract 
to build thirty-eight mobile fire units and 885 
supersonic missiles. 
139. The test firing of Roland missiles would 
take place at White Sands missile range, New 
Mexico. The first missiles would be delivered 
to the army in the summer of 1981 and the first 
fire unit delivery was scheduled for the autumn 
of1981. 
140. European procedures would be used as a 
guide for United States procedures; there would 
be an exchange of visits between United States 
and European test designers in order to assure 
interoperability. There was a steady exchange 
of industrial representatives between Europe 
and America. There had been a very extensive 
data package transfer and the European metric 
system and drawing practices had been adopted 
in the United States. Some United States 
Government requirements had even had to be 
modified to take full advantage of the techno-
logy transfer. This transfer from Europe to 
America meant overcoming difficulties as the 
United States Government was inexperienced in 
using converted foreign technology as it had 
very little experience in importing techno-
logy. The conclusion was however that tech-
nology import could work, that military requi-
rements could be fulfilled at reduced develop-
ment costs and that NATO could benefit eco-
nomically and logistically by standardisation. 
AWACS 
141. The airborne warning and control sys-
tem, officially designated the United States air 
force E-3A, was a United States-developed pro-
gramme and meant a transfer of technology 
from the United States to Europe. The system 
was a mobile survivable high-capacity radar 
station and command and control centre in a 
Boeing 707 airframe. This airframe had been 
chosen to avoid the cost of developing a special 
aircraft. The system provided detection, track-
ing and identification of aircraft over great dis-
tances during all kinds of weather and over all 
kinds of terrain. A maritime version could 
also track ships at sea. At the same time, it 
could command and control the total air effort: 
strike, air superiority, support, airlift, recon-
naissance and interdiction. In the event of a 
threat, the system could direct weapons in its 
own defence. 
142. Its radar system would be extremely diffi-
cult to jam and the tracking and interception of 
airborne jammers was a built-in AWACS capa-
bility. The system was regularly updated, such 
as with a new data-display remoting system. 
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The purpose of the system was to permit 
more effective use of existing weapons systems. 
143. The first aircraft had been delivered to 
the United States air force in March 1977 and 
the last of the thirty-four aircraft would be deli-
vered in 1984. The NATO programme had 
been started in 1979 and the first flight would 
take place in September 1981. For the NATO 
programme of eighteen aircraft, Boeing had 
concluded arrangements with Dornier for 
mechanical support equipment and with a 
number of German electronics firms for build-
ing software and data-processing components. 
In Europe, the United Kingdom had a similar 
compatible system, but built on eleven 
Nimrods. 
Energy programmes 
144. The Boeing energy and environment divi-
sion was involved in uranium enrichment, 
nuclear power plants, electric power manage-
ment, electromagnetic test facilities and also 
played a significant role in the effort to find 
efficient and economical ways to produce 
energy from the sun and the wind. The 
world's largest wind turbine had been com-
pleted and successfully operated at a site in 
Washington State. In June 1981, three wind 
turbines at this site were supplying enough elec-
trical energy for about 2,000 homes in the 
area. The Department of Energy and NASA 
would evaluate the commercial feasibility of 
this project. The Federal wind energy pro-
gramme had been started in 1973 and in 1977 
Boeing was awarded a contract for the design, 
manufacture, construction, installation and test-
ing of a 2.5 megawatt wind turbine system. 
The contract called for four machines, three of 
which would be located as one unit in the State 
of Washington; the fourth unit would be ins-
talled in Wyoming. The ultimate goal of the 
project was to demonstrate the feasibility of 
large wind machines and determine the cost for 
commercialisation. The first commercial cus-
tomer was the San Francisco Electricity 
Company. 
Viking spacecraft 
145. The Viking was an unmanned scientific 
satellite which Boeing would build together 
with the Swedish Space Corporation, which 
would have management responsibility for the 
programme and would conduct orbital opera-
tions from the Swedish ground station at Kir-
una. The experiments on board Viking would 
investigate interactions between hot and cold 
plasma along the auroral field lines. The mis-
sion would take eight months and would give 
an insight into aurora borealis phenomena 
which would be of special interest for northern 
regions. Scientific groups in five countries -
Canada, Denmark, France, Sweden and the 
United States - were interested in its results. 
Boeing Company was manufacturing, assem-
bling and testing the spacecraft platform. The 
satellite would be launched in March 1984 and 
placed in an elliptical orbit. 
Space Operations Centre 
146. With the shuttle becoming operational in 
1983, it would be of great interest to establish a 
permanent manned station in low orbit. From 
1989, such a station could be used to service 
application satellites. NASA's Johnson Space 
Centre had started its studies on such a station 
in 1978 and concluded a contrat with Boeing 
for the operational design and assembling of the 
station. There would be two habitation modu-
les, each for a four-mao crew, a hangar for 
satellites and a 100 kilowatt solar array panel. 
Boeing would start the project by building 
first one habitation, one service and one logistic 
module. It would also build the instruments to 
bring the satellite out of space into the service 
module. The first station would weigh some 
60,000 kilos and once the station was fully ope-
rational and complete it would weigh some 
124,000 kilos. The life of the vehicle would be 
some ten years and the crew would be able to 
stay on the station ninety days at a stretch. 
WASP 
147. For the United States air force, Boeing 
was building a prototype of an anti-tank air-
launched weapons system which would be able 
to operate in all weather conditions, at night 
and when confronted with the smoke and haze 
of the battlefield. Boeing was in competition 
with Hughes Aircraft for this battlefield missile 
system. It should be able to operate against 
second echelon armoured vehicles at a distance 
of 150 km. The WASP system was composed 
of missiles, pod launchers and carrier aircraft 
with equipment to monitor targets and launch 
the weapons. Each missile would be capable 
of autonomous acquisition and tracking and 
could be launched individually or massively. 
The pod launcher would contain twelve mis-
siles which could be launched in a few seconds. 
The WASP system would be used primarily 
on the F-16, F-Ill or the F-4, and could be fit-
ted on the Mirage, Harrier, Tornado or Jaguar. 
The validation period before a definite 
contract could be concluded would be forty-two 
months. Four European contractors had been 
associated with the programme - British Aero-
space, MBB, Dornier and Matra. They were, 
for instance, designing interphase equipment for 
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European aircraft. The air force would select a 
single contractor for full-scale engineering deve-
lopment in 1983. 
Hydrofoils 
148. In its plant in Renton, the Committee 
visited the hydrofoils and jetfoils being built by 
Boeing marine systems. The hydrofoils used 
much technology of modern aircraft and missi-
les. Boeing had started its research with 
hydro-dynamic test systems in the early 1960s, 
and began building hydrofoil missile ships for 
the United States navy as well as for European 
navies in the 1970s. The Renton factory used 
an assembly line approach for cost-effecti-
veness and quality control. During 1980 
the keels were laid for the last three of the five 
patrol hydrofoil missile ships on order from the 
United States navy. Final delivery would be in 
1983. Italy and the United Kingdom had also 
ordered this type of missile ship - the latter for 
North Sea patrols round the oil rigs. They 
were capable of an average speed of some forty-
three knots. 
149. As the Soviets now appeared to be deve-
loping a force-projection naval capability, it did 
not seem very wise to combat this expansion 
with a plan for a similar type of naval force. 
This would hardly be economically feasi-
ble. A new concept for naval forces should 
therefore be considered and the hydrofoil could 
economically counter the expanded threat. 
With this type of ship it would be possible to 
achieve the destruction of critical strategic ele-
ments of the opposing naval force. This could 
be done with the fast and highly manceuvrable 
hydrofoils properly equipped with anti-aircraft 
and anti-ship missiles. They would ensure 
greater survivability because of their superior 
speed and manceuvrability, and more units 
could be used as the offensive capability could 
be packaged in a much smaller ocean-going 
ship. 
150. For commercial passenger sea transport, 
Boeing had developed the jetfoil which had 
started service in 1975.and was now being built 
for many countries in both Europe and the Far 
East. The Committee visited one which was 
being prepared for Indonesia, but they were 
also in use in Hong Kong, Singapore, etc. 
Boeing 757-767 
151. The production of two new aircraft, the 
small-bodied 150-180 seater 7 57 and the 7 6 7 
wide-bodied aircraft with 220-280 seats, started 
in 1979 and the first 767 left the factory in 
1981. The 757 would probably be ready in 
early 1982. By the 1990s a market of more 
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than 1,000 was anticipated for each of the new 
aircraft, 1 ,500 for the 767 and 1,200 for the 
757. Both would consume about one-third less 
fuel than the aircraft they were to replace. 
152. The 767 had new aerodynamic engineer-
ing, new engines and a very modern compute-
rised flight control system. Its range was 3,200 
nautical miles, which could be extended to 
about 5,000 nautical miles. The smaller 757 
would have a range of 2,500 miles, which 
could possibly be extended up to 3,000 miles. 
153. Operational costs of aircraft used to be 
about 42 % labour, 3 7 % capital and 21 % fuel. 
Now fuel accounted for 65 %. Fuel saving 
of 30% to 40% would therefore be extremely 
important for energy-conscious airlines in the 
1980s. Of the 767, 173 had already been 
ordered and options had been taken for another 
138. 
154. The 767 would be a direct competitor of 
the Airbus-310 which probably would be ready 
in February 1982. The Airbus also would be 
very energy efficient and would weigh some 
three tons less than the 767. 
155. In order to close the gap between the 757 
and the existing 73 7, Boeing was planning to 
build the 737-300 which would then be, with a 
lengthened fuselage, a 150-seater. 
156. An advantage of the new 767 would be 
more cargo in the lower hold through a contai-
ner system which would make it easy to bring 
an economical cargo service to small markets. 
The Committee saw mock-ups of both new 
aircraft. 
Grumman Corporation 
157. On 24th July 1981 the Committee visited 
the head office of Grumman Corporation at 
Bethpage, New York, where it was briefed on 
the corporation which was divided into five 
divisions: aerospace, allied industries, data sys-
tems, energy systems and Grumman International. 
158. The corporation · had existed for fifty 
years and employed some 27,000 people. It 
produced a variety of military, especially navy, 
aircraft such as the F-14, the E-2C Hawkeye, 
the A-6E Intruder, its derivative the EA-6B 
Prowler, and the new EF-111 which had been 
started for the United States air force in 1980. 
159. The F-14 was the United States navy's 
first line air superiority fighter with a variable 
sweep wing and a speed over Mach 2. The 
F-14 was now in service with many naval squa-
drons. It had both dog-fight and air-defence 
roles. Its primary weapon, the Phoenix missile, 
could reach a supersonic target at more than 
185 km. 
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160. The A-6E all-weather attack aircraft, the 
Intruder, was the latest version of the navy and 
marine corps attack aircraft. It had good all-
weather low-altitude manreuvrability both day 
and night. 
161. The E-2C Hawkeye, which was the 
navy's latest airborne early-warning command 
and control aircraft, was designed for the air 
defence of the fleet. Secondary mission capa-
bilities included surface surveillance, strike 
control, search and rescue, air traffic control 
and communications relay. It was packed with 
4,500 kg of electronics and could monitor 20 
million cubic kilometres of airspace and the 
ocean or land beneath it. 
162. It had been purchased by Japan and 
Israel. 
163. The EA-6B Prowler was an all-weather 
attack aircraft with an extensive electronic 
counter-measures system. This could jam the 
most advanced enemy radar, creating a safe cor-
ridor for attack aircraft or providing a task force 
defensive shield against air-to-surface or subma-
rine-launched missiles. 
164. The EF-111 was a conversion of the 
General Dynamics F-111 fighter-bomber. It 
would provide cover for air-to-ground opera-
tions along the forward lines and for the sup-
port of penetrating allied strike forces. Three 
basic models were foreseen and deliveries would 
start in 1981 up until 1985 for a total of forty-
two aircraft. They would fly in combination 
with the E-2C Hawkeye. 
165. During the discussions it was underlined 
that a great effort should be made to bring the 
military requirements into line with budgetary 
possibilities. This could be done only if the 
development costs of new aircraft were reduced 
by using new composite materials and develop-
ing more economic engines. 
166. Grumman's activities in space were 
mainly concerned with the production of the 
wings for the space shuttle and the design and 
construction of a manned remote work station 
for NASA that would fit into the space shuttle's 
cargo bay to permit astronauts to service or 
repair vehicles in orbit and to assemble them in 
space. Grumman also had developed several 
concepts for space-based radar antennas ranging 
in size from 30 to 300 metres in diameter that 
would fold into the cargo bay of the space shut-
tle and could be unfurled in space .. 
167. Grumman's international relationships 
included activities with many companies and 
governments in Europe. It was especially inte-
rested in the Tornado which could provide a 
powerful platform for an electronic jammer. It 
was very keen on collaborating in European-
produced weapons systems and it would intro-
duce and sponsor the Tornado into the United 
States. However, the European governments 
concerned with the Tornado needed to take a 
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greater interest in this type of joint venture. 
They gave the impression that they did not 
have much faith in the capabilities of their own 
aircraft industries. European parliaments 
should pay special attention to this aspect of 
international co-operation. 
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APPENDIX I 
Programme of the visit to the United States by the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
Sunday, 12th July 
6.10 p.m. 
Monday, 13th July 
9.40 a.m.- 12.15 p.m. 
12.30 p.m.- 4.15 p.m. 
Tuesday, 14th July 
8.30 a.m.- 12.25 p.m. 
12th-24th July 1981 
Arrival at National Airport, Washington, D.C. 
Hotel: Holiday Inn 
1501 Rhode Island Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Department of State 
2201 C Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20520 
Address by Mr. H. Allen Holmes, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for European Affairs. 
Address by Mr. James Malone, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans 
and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. 
Department of Defence 
The Pentagon 
Washington, D.C. 20301 
Address by Dr. Richard DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defence for 
Research and Engineering. 
Address by Mr. Frank Cevasco on co-operation in NATO. 
Address by Colonel Conrad 0. Forsythe on space applications in 
defence. 
Address by Dr. George Wilburn on science and technology problems. 
NASA 
400 Maryland Avenue, S.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20546 
Welcome by Dr. James Beggs, Designated Administrator, NASA. 
Address by Mr. Leroy Day, Director Space Translation Systems Engi-
neering and Integration. 
Address by Dr. Stanley Weiss, Associate Administrator for Space Trans-
portation Systems Operations. 
Address by Mr. Jesse W. Moore, Director, Spacelab Flight Division, 
Office of Space Sciences. 
Address by Dr. William Raney, Assistant Associate Administrator, Office 
of Space and Terrestrial Applications. 
Address by Mr. Pederson, Director, International Affairs· Division. 
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12.30 p.m.- 4 p.m. 
Wednesday, 15th July 
8 a.m. - 11 a.m. 
4 p.m. - 6 p.m. 
Thursday, 16th July 
9 a.m. - 11.30 a.m. 
6.15 p.m. 
8.52 p.m. 
:·Friday, 17th July 
9 a.m. - 3 p.m. 
Goddard Space Flight Center 
Greenbelt 
Maryland 20771 
Dirksen Senate Office Building 
The Capitol 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
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Working breakfast with the Senate Committee for Commerce, Science 
and Transportation and the House Committee on Science and Techno-
logy. 
The following members were present: 
Senator Harrison H. Schmitt (Republican, New Mexico); 
Senator Ted Stevens (Republican, Alaska); 
Mr. Don Fuqua (Democrat, Florida); 
Mr. James H. Scheuer (Democrat, New York); 
Mr. Larry Wino, Jr. (Republican, Kansas). 
Members of staff: 
Mr. Gerald J. Kovach, Senior Counsellor; 
Miss Carol S. Lane; 
Mr. Philip B. Yeagar, General Counsellor. 
European Space Agency 
Suite 1404 
955 L'Enfant Plaza North, S.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20024 
Address by Colonel Wilfred Mellors, Head ofthe Washington Office. 
Department of Energy 
James Forrestal Building 
1110 Independence Avenue, S.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20585 
Address by Dr. Joseph A. Leary, Director of Non-Proliferation and Envi-
ronmental Affairs, Office of Nuclear Energy. 
Address by Dr. Lloyd 0. Herwig, Senior Scientific Adviser, Assistant 
Secretary, Office of Conservation and Renewable Energy. 
Leave Washington National Airport for Orlando. 
Arrival at Orlando, Florida. 
Hotel: Harley Hotel 
151 East Washington Street 
Orlando, Florida 
Kennedy Space Flight Center 
Florida 32899 
Welcome and briefing by Mr. Richard G. Smith, Director. 
Address by Mr. Bob Gunnar on the space shuttle. 
Address by Mr. George English on Spacelab. 
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Saturday, 18th July 
4 p.m. 
7.19 p.m. 
Monday, 20th July 
9.20 a.m.- 2 p.m. 
2 p.m. 
4.11 p.m. 
Tuesday, 21st July 
8.15 a.m.- 11.30 a.m. 
12.30 p.m.- 4 p.m. 
Leave Orlando Airport for San Diego. 
Arrival at San Diego. 
Hotel: Sheraton Harbor Island Inn 
1380 Harbor Island Drive 
San Diego 
General Dynamics Corporation 
Convair Division 
P.O. Box 80847 
San Diego, California 92138 
APPENDIX I 
Welcome and general address by Mr. G.E. Blackshaw, Vice-President 
Research and Engineering. 
Address by Mr. B.K. Beaver on cruise missile programmes and on the 
F-16. 
Address by Mr. M.P. Felix on missile and gun systems. 
Address by Mr. S.L. Ackerman on energy programmes. 
Address by Mr. R.C. White on space programmes. 
Address by Mr. A. Carrier on tactical weapons production by the 
Pomona Division of General Dynamics. 
Leave for Los Angeles. 
Arrival at Los Angeles. 
Hotel: Ramada Inn - Hollywood 
1160 N. Vermont Avenue 
Hollywood, California 90029 
Lockheed California Company 
2555 North Hollywood Way 
Burbank, California 91520 
Welcome by Mr. Horst Lux. 
Address by Mr. Bob Merino on the Lockheed Corporation. 
Address by M. Richard Fry on the United States navy trainer programme 
(Alpha-Jet). 
Address by Mr. Louis Caton on export programmes of the P-3 Orion 
anti-submarine warfare aircraft. 
Address by Mr. Andy Byrnes on commercial scientific and technology 
problems. 
Douglas Aircraft Company Division of McDonnell Douglas Corporation 
3855 Lakewood Boulevard 
Long Beach, California 90846 
Address by Mr. John L. Cooke on the McDonnell Douglas Corporation. 
Address by Mr. Bob Lowel on the McDonnell Douglas navy trainer pro-
gramme. 





Wednesday, 22nd July 
8 a.m. - 4 p.m. 
Thursday, 23rd July 
8.15 a.m. 
4.10 p.m. 
Friday, 24th July 
9.15 a.m. -4 p.m. 
Leave for Seattle. 
Arrival at Seattle Tacoma International Airport. 
Hotel: Sherwood Inn 
400 North East 45th Street 
Seattle, Washington 
Boeing Aerospace Company 
P.O. Box 3999 
Seattle, Washington 98124 
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Welcome and address on the Boeing Company by Mr. D.E. Graves. 
Address by Mr. J. Monson on the American Roland programme. 
Address by Mr. T .C. Manning on AWACS. 
Address by Mr. G.E. Andrew on Boeing energy programmes. 
Address by Mr. B. Brentnall on the Viking programme. 
Address by Mr. M. Colsen on the space operations centre. 
Address by Mr. W.B. Adam on the WASP programme. 
Address by Mr. B. Mishel on hydrofoils. 
Address by Mr. R.E. Sancewich on the 7571767 technology. 
.Leave Seattle Tacoma International Airport. 
Arrival at New York John F. Kennedy International Airport. 
Hotel: Parker Meridien Hotel 
119 W. 56th Street 
New York 
Grumman Aerospace Company 
1111 Stewart Avenue 
Bethpage, N.Y. 11714 
Welcome and address on the Grumman Aerospace Company by Mr. G. 
Skurla, President and Chairman of the Board. 
Address by Mr. M. Pelehach on military requirements versus budget 
realities. 
Address by Mr. M. Ciminera on advanced systems technology and cur-
rent Grumman aircraft programmes. 
Address by Mr. D. Terry on future applications of Grumman products. 
Address by Mr. A. Kaplan on the E-2C Hawkeye, the airborne early 
warning command and control aircraft, built by Grumman. 
Address by Mr. F. Haise on space technology and space programmes. 
Address by Mr. R. Le Cann on international co-operative ventures. 
END OF VISIT 
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APPENDIX II 
List of questions put during the visit to the United States 
Questions for the State Department 
NATO affairs 
On 15th June 1981, Mr. Lawrence Eagle-
burger, Assistant Secretary of State for Euro-
pean Affairs, declared that NATO should avoid 
two classes of membership and that if the deci-
sions taken in Rome in 1981 on the so-called 
"two-track" commitment were not kept, we 
would give the Soviets the impression that they 
had a veto over NATO decisions. 
Could this point be explained further? 
How will it be ensured that the interchange 
with allies covers the full spectrum of western 
security aspects and how will a new consensus 
on requirements for the Alliance be defined? 
Do we need new consultative mechanisms 
outside the NATO framework - either smaller 
like the group of Seven, or larger, including 
non-NATO countries such as Japan? 
The most hotly debated question in the 
Alliance today is clearly the nuclear issue and 
the implementation of new steps in nuclear 
armament in Europe. Is there a divergence 
between United States and European objectives 
with regard to the "two-track" decision? 
Should we all aim for a security policy of a 
global nature? 
Research and development policy 
How can the general political aims of the 
new administration be defined with regard to 
scientific and technological programmes in the 
civil and military fields? 
What is the present budgetary trend and 
how will this change in the near future? 
To which sectors will the federal govern-
ment give priority in the 1980s? 
In which fields is European collaboration 
particularly sought? Is an evolution in United 
States-European relations to be expected: 
- in the aerospace field? 
- in armaments programmes and arms 
sales abroad? 
- on arms control arrangements? 
- in the civil nuclear field? 
Mr. Walter J. Stoessel, Under Secretary of 
State, called for stronger nuclear non-
proliferation safeguards to lessen the kind of 
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suspicion that was a factor in Israel's attack on 
the Iraqi nuclear facility on 7th June 
1981. What stronger safeguard measures are 
possible? 
Sea law 
For the past fifteen years there have been 
discussions on the law of the sea. Could you 
explain the administration's new policy on the 
law of the sea conference which is scheduled to 
begin its new (tenth) session in Geneva on 3rd 
August? 
Why did the administration decide to slow 
down the negotiating processes? 
Is there a likelihood of the negotiations 
reaching a final conclusion in 1981 or 1982? 
A successful treaty must be based on agree-
ment between industrialised nations and the so-
called "group of 77" developing countries. 
What are the industrial reasons for deep-
sea mining and how economically important 
are the mineral deposits on the seabed? 
What should be the competence of any 
supranational mining company formed by the 
United Nations? How would technology trans-
fer be carried out? 
Can competition between land-based min-
ing and seabed mining be quantified? 
Which elements of national security are 
involved in industrial mining technology? 
Can the draft convention on the law of the 
sea be modified within a reasonable time? 
Addressing the House of Representatives' 
Subcommittee for Merchant Marine and Fishe-
ries on 28th April 1981, Mr. James L. Malone, 
Assistant Secretary of State, declared: 
"The draft convention creates a one-nation 
one-vote international organisation which 
is governed by an assembly and a 
36-member executive council. In the 
council, the Soviet Union and its allies 
have three guaranteed seats, but the US 
must compete with its allies for any repre-
sentation. The assembly is characterised 
as the 'supreme' organ and the specific 
policy decisions of the council must 
conform to the general policies of the 
assembly. 
APPENDIX II 
The draft convention provides that, after 
15 years of production, the provisions of 
the treaty will be reviewed to determine 
whether it has fulfilled overriding policy 
considerations, such as protection of land-
based producers, promotion of enterprise 
operations and equitable distribution of 
mining rights. If two-thirds of the states, 
parties to the treaty, wish to amend provi-
sions concerning the system of exploitation, 
they may do so after five years of negotia-
tion and after ratification by two-thirds of 
the states parties. If the US were to disa-
gree with duly ratified changes, it would be 
bound by them nevertheless, unless it 
exercised its option to denounce the entire 
treaty. 
The draft convention imposes revenue-
sharing obligations on seabed mining cor-
porations which would significantly increase 
the costs of seabed mining. 
The draft convention imposes an interna-
tional revenue-sharing obligation on the 
production of hydrocarbons from the conti-
nental shelf beyond the 200-mile (322-km) 
limit. Developing countries that are net 
importers of hydrocarbons are exempt from 
the obligation. 
The draft convention contains provisions 
concerning liberation movements, like the 
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation), 
and their eligibility to obtain a share of the 
revenues of the seabed authority. 
The draft convention lacks any provisions 
for protecting investments made prior to 
entry into force of the convention." 
Questions for the Defence Department 
Space activities 
One of the recommendations in Mr. Wil-
kinson's report on the future of European space 
activities was "To promote in a North Atlantic 
Alliance context the exploitation of European 
military communication and observation satell-
ites and the investigation of the military impli-
cations of space technology." What is your 
opinion on this recommendation? 
It has often been written that Soviet space 
activities with military potential far exceed 
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United States programmes in this field. Do 
you share this opinion? 
Will there be a future need for space-based 
defence against ballistic missiles, for interceptor 
satellite systems and for laser and beam wea-
pon applications? 
The main areas of interest are communica-
tions, navigation, early warning, surveillance 
and weather forecasting. What will be the 
repercussions of the space shuttle when it 
becomes operational in 1983? 
Questions for NASA 
What are your views on the International 
Solar-Polar Mission issue, the solution of which 
is of the greatest importance for future space 
co-operation between Europe and the United 
States? 
What are the views of the United States 
Government and Congress on the future of 
space co-operation with Europe in the field of: 
- space science? 
- space applications: room or necessity for 
complementarity or exclusively competi-
tion? 
- Space Transportation Systems (STS): 
- Where does the United States go 
now? (improvement of STS; develop-
ment of retrievable carriers; develop-
ment of a space operations centre)? 
- What role could/should Europe play in 
this context, if at all? 
How do the United States Government and 
Congress see the national United States space 
activities? Are they sufficiently ambitious? 
Can they stand further budgetary restric-
tions? 
Questions for the Department of Energy 
What is the new administration's policy 
regarding the United States Synthetic Fuels 
Corporation? 
Pricewise, is methanol competitive with 
gasoiine? 
Will it be possible to organise a network of 
methanol service stations? 
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